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What can We learn from the 
misunderstandings of radical 
constructivism?
commentary on slezak’s “radical constructivism: 
epistemology, education and dynamite”
Dewey I. Dykstra, Jr. • Boise State University • ddykstra@boisestate.edu
> Problem • What alternative strategies from our experiences using a Piaget-based radical constructivist pedagogy 
might have more and better results than the current practice of responding in debate form, each side trying to prove 
the other wrong? > method • Use of Slezak’s paper to illuminate the point that the central problem with the interpre-
tation of RC generally used in such writing is that the authors seem not to be able to operate from the central tenet of 
RC, which is the opposite of that used in realism. Description of how this failure to use the central tenet of RC results in 
claims that RC is irrelevant to education and to definitions of good teaching. > results • A specific approach shown to 
be useful in facilitating the construction of new understanding in science is adapted in order to guide interaction be-
tween an RC and a realist, which can result in the realist understanding the RC point of view. > implications • Instead 
of debating with critics of RC, where each side is trying to prove the other side wrong, we need to change the interac-
tion to one in which members of opposing sides attempt to understand the other’s position. In this situation we are in 
a position to use a pedagogical strategy in which the realist examines her own fundamental assumption that we can 
know a mind-independent world, and considers the implications of a starting assumption that is exactly the opposite.
> Key words • Realism, good teaching, solipsism, disequilibration, folk theory teaching.
introduction
We have seen many criticisms of radical 
constructivism (RC) in many venues from 
those representing realism, objectivism, and 
materialism. The paper by Peter slezak in 
this issue is a good example (slezak 2010). 
in this commentary i attempt to supple-
ment the excellent commentary on slezak’s 
paper by Leslie steffe (2010). needless to 
say, i wholeheartedly agree with steffe’s lines 
of reasoning. He has identified some of the 
fundamental issues in these “constructiv-
ism debates” and has cogently responded to 
them.
Between us, i believe steffe and i touch 
on the fundamental issues in the debate, but 
not the many other finer points that might 
be raised about this particular paper. Clear-
ing the fundamental issues can tend to ren-
der some of the finer points moot. as steffe 
points out in his first paragraph, others will 
have different interpretations. We offer our 
comments to illuminate the reasoning pre-
sented from a RC point of view.
in the first section, i offer some addi-
tional insight to what steffe calls “an unjus-
tified criticism” and offer an explanation of 
why this unjustified criticism might be so 
often voiced. in the second section, i address 
claims typically made about RC with respect 
to education based on misunderstandings 
of RC. in the third section, the question, 
“What is good teaching?” is addressed in 
terms of a distinction between a realist view 
and an RC view.
origins of the unjustified 
criticism
in the Fall of 1989, i spent the semester 
at Carnegie Mellon university working with 
a colleague on the first stage of a project to 
construct an artificially intelligent conceptu-
al physics tutor. My relatives live near Wash-
ington, dC, so i took the opportunity early 
in the semester to drive down to visit them 
and our program officer, Ray Hannapel, at 
nsF in dC. Ray and i talked about various 
things including the project. at one point 
Ray said: “You sound like Ernst von Glaser-
sfeld. do you know his work?” When i re-
plied that i was unfamiliar with von Glaser-
sfeld’s work, Ray provided me with Ernst’s 
well-known chapter, “an introduction to 
Radical Constructivism,” (Glasersfeld 1984) 
in a book named The Invented Reality.
i had seen the term “constructivism” in 
the publications of Rosalind driver’s group 
at Leeds. For about 10 years, i had been us-
ing Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive equili-
bration in my thinking about learning and 
teaching physics. There was something dif-
ferent between how i was thinking at the 
time and the details of the Leeds group dis-
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cussion of constructivism, but i could not 
clearly describe it.
i was interested to see if this “radi-
cal constructivism” of von Glasersfeld 
was closer or not to how i was thinking. 
i read the piece once during the weekend. 
something bothered me. i agreed with ev-
erything i was seeing in von Glasersfeld’s 
chapter but one thing: it seemed he was 
talking about solipsism. i could not see 
how i could agree with the rest so much, 
yet have it end up in solipsism. as a person 
who is in physics, solipsism just does not fit 
my experience. i spent several days mull-
ing this over, rereading the chapter several 
times daily. Finally on a warm afternoon 
later that week, walking back from the of-
fice on campus to my apartment several 
blocks away, i realized that von Glasersfeld 
was not talking about solipsism. instead he 
was talking about not being able to com-
pare directly our explanatory stories con-
cerning our world of experience with some 
independently existing world; that is, we 
cannot determine the truth of such expla-
nation or even their relative proximity to 
truth, but merely determine how well they 
fit the evidence of our experience. 
The contradiction that i first thought 
was there did not exist. indeed, von Gla-
sersfeld was rendering on paper what i had 
begun to think about the origins and nature 
of students’ conceptions of phenomena and 
he was helping me fill in gaps. There was no 
contradiction between my understanding 
of Piaget’s ideas, of von Glasersfeld’s ideas, 
and my own experience.
This little story about my first reading 
of the piece on RC by von Glasersfeld and 
at first thinking RC is solipsism – a denial 
of the existence of an objective reality in-
dependent of our own thinking – is some-
thing i have seen repeated many times. 
one can see countless examples of this in 
the “constructivism debates” in all forms 
of media. The first response of a material-
ist, realist, objectivist to a statement such 
as “our knowledge can never be interpreted 
as a picture or representation of that real 
world” (Glasersfeld 1984: 18) is to jump to 
the conclusion: if we cannot know a mind-
independent reality, then there must not be 
any mind-independent reality, i.e. solip-
sism. one can argue from the evidence that 
for most such people there seem to be only 
two options: either this mind-independent, 
objective reality exists and we can know it, 
or it does not exist and we cannot know it.1 
What such a conclusion derives from is the 
unquestioned notion that the result of our 
mental efforts approaches a true description 
of a mind-independent reality. two physi-
cists described this idea in the following 
way:
“ …we postulate the objective existence of physi-
cal reality that can be known to our minds…with 
an ever growing precision by the subtle play of 
theory and experiment.” (de la torre & Zamo-
rano 2001: 103)
if it is possible to know this mind-inde-
pendent reality then if one claims we cannot 
know it, there must not be a mind-indepen-
dent reality. Logically, if the first premise 
is not taken, then the rest of the reasoning 
does not follow, which is the position in RC. 
The adherence to this first premise can be 
seen to be the origin of the criticism that RC 
is solipsism. Those who have not let go of 
this fundamental tenet of realism are not in 
a position to understand RC. 
That RC has dropped this tenet, as 
pointed out by von Glasersfeld in several 
of the quotations from him in slezak’s pa-
per, constitutes a fundamental distinction 
with major implications for the nature and 
status of knowledge. it is clear that those 
who do not understand the implications of 
dropping this one assumption, that we can 
know a mind-independent world, tend to 
1 | We should note that this “either-or” is a 
conflation of two propositions: either 1) a mind-
independent reality exists and 2) we can know 
that mind-independent reality or the negatives of 
these two propositions.  Where RC differs from 
realism is that RC does not consider these confla-
tions.  it deals with the second proposition, that 
we can know a mind-independent reality, and 
all that this entails.  specifically, RC holds that 
we should not claim we can know a mind-inde-
pendent reality, because all we have is whether 
or not our constructed explanations fit our ex-
periential world.  since we hold that we cannot 
know a mind-independent world, we can take no 
definitive position on such a world and taking no 
definitive position does not in any way hinder our 
efforts to construct explanations to enable us to be 
successful and survive.
gloss over this point, as we see in the paper. 
one of the many results is failure to realize 
what the adjective “radical” is intended to 
signify:
“ von Glasersfeld (1995a) explains that radical 
constructivism is ‘an unconventional approach 
to the problem of knowledge and knowing’ that 
‘starts from the assumption that knowledge, no 
matter how it is defined, is in the heads of per-
sons, and that the thinking subject has no alter-
native but to construct what he or she knows on 
the basis of his or her own experience … it is 
unclear why such truisms might warrant extrav-
agant claims for being radical and revolutionary.” 
(slezak 2010: 107)
assuming that when a person reads von 
Glasersfeld where he writes that the adjec-
tive “radical” refers to “going to the root of ” 
a distinction between realism and RC as to 
whether one makes the same assumption as 
de la torre and Zamorano, then this is evi-
dence that the detractors of RC may not be 
doing their homework when studying RC. 
alternatively, if they have done their home-
work, it is also distinctly possible that, not 
realizing this distinction, the detractors 
make a different meaning of von Glasers-
feld’s words than he intends. in short, the 
adjective “radical” in RC is not intended to 
refer to the ideas of “far out,” “not main-
stream,” “beyond fringe” that were intro-
duced to the meaning of radical by the 
surfer culture in the u.s. back in the 1960s. 
The radical in RC refers to the fact that RC 
goes to its roots in the nature of knowledge.
While the physicists de la torre and 
Zamorano appear to be in the realist camp, 
others are clearly not. For example, Max 
Planck wrote:
“ now there are two theorems that form together 
the cardinal hinge on which the whole structure 
of physical science turns. These theorems  are: 
(1) there is a real outer world that exists indepen-
dently of our act of knowing and (2) the real outer 
world is not directly knowable.” (Planck 1932: 82, 
emphasis in the original)
in this passage we see one of the fa-
thers of quantum theory seem to take the 
same position on our ability to know the 
real outer world as do von Glasersfeld and 
Piaget.
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Because i have developed and use a RC/
Piaget-based pedagogy and have been doing 
so for nearly 30 years, i spend a fair amount 
of time helping my students come to grips 
with the nature of knowledge in such a 
pedagogy. along with the numerous “con-
structivism debates,” presentations at con-
ferences, journal articles and books written 
attempting to “prove” RC is wrong and bad 
for people, i have watched literally several 
thousand people have this same initial reac-
tion to RC’s view of the nature of knowledge: 
that RC is solipsism.
We are all so immersed in a realist, ob-
jectivist, materialist culture that, without 
our being aware of it, realism has become 
part of the “air we breathe.” Most in soci-
ety take this realism as given, just the way 
things are. For the realist, no other options 
than that either the mind-independent 
world exists or it does not are available. a 
second taken-as-given notion in this realism 
is that the explanation we develop is true or 
a nearly true “picture” of a mind-indepen-
dent world, with its corollary being that we 
can determine which of two explanations is 
closer to the truth of a mind-independent 
world. These two ideas taken together make 
it no surprise at all that the first reaction to 
a description of RC is that RC is just solip-
sism. We should be surprised if this was not 
the initial reaction.
Clearly, this little drama repeats itself in 
RC-critical papers, as we see here in several 
passages from slezak’s paper:
“ [von Glasersfeld] recommends: ‘Give up the re-
quirement that knowledge represents an indepen-
dent world’ (1995b: 6–7) … on a different con-
strual, the idea that there is no mind-independent 
world is undoubtedly a radical proposal.” (slezak 
2010: 103)
“ it is in keeping with his insistence on rejecting an 
unknowable ontological reality to read von Glaser-
sfeld’s remarks as Quine’s holism.” (ibid: 106)
“ They reject the external world when they evidently 
wish to reject absolute, infallible truth claims. of 
course, the fallibility of our scientific knowledge 
is undoubtedly an important insight but is hardly 
new with radical constructivism and it is unclear 
who the target may be for von Glasersfeld’s cri-
tique on this score.” (ibid: 106–107, emphasis 
added)
The resistance to letting go of the prem-
ise that we can know the mind-independent 
world apparently leads critics of RC to miss 
the fact that Quine, whom slezak quotes 
below, is saying essentially the same as von 
Glasersfeld on the issue.
“ Hence it is meaningless, i suggest, to inquire 
into the absolute correctness of a conceptual 
scheme as a mirror of reality. our standard for 
appraising basic changes of 
conceptual scheme must be, 
not a realistic standard of 
correspondence to reality, 
but a pragmatic standard.” 
(Quine 1961: 79, quoted in 
slezak 2010: 106)
“ von Glasersfeld’s notion of 
‘viability’ seems best under-
stood as a ‘coherentist’ position concerned with 
what he calls ‘the goal of a coherent conceptual 
organization of the world as we experience it’ 
(steffe & Gale 1995: 7), and with ‘the goal of 
constructing as coherent a model as possible of 
the experiential world’ (ibid: 8).” (slezak 2010: 
106)
There is other evidence that being able 
to know a mind-independent world is still 
very fundamental to the thinking of those 
against RC. Coherence and viability are 
not interchangeable notions. The desire for 
coherence is not an idea that is claimed to 
be unique to RC. The desire for coherence 
is common to descriptions of the devel-
opment of rational explanation from all 
points of view. Realists, objectivists and 
materialists strive for the same thing, co-
herence, in their practice of understanding 
and developing science. What distinguish-
es RC from other views is its position that 
the role of knowledge rests on its viability, 
its fit to experience, not its correspondence 
to a mind-independent world. This substi-
tution of coherence for viability is another 
manifestation of the notion that one can 
know a mind-independent world being 
still central to the thinking of those who 
oppose RC.
“ Following Quine, our ontological commitments 
are ipso facto the posits of our best theories and 
have nothing to do with an inaccessible, unknow-
able reality lying beyond our experience, our 
theories or the ‘veil of ideas.’ it is this repeated 
emphasis on an inaccessible or unknowable real-
ity by von Glasersfeld that warrants the repeated 
charge of idealism.” (slezak 2010: 106)
The “veil of ideas” notion is an attribu-
tion by slezak, not one that is present in von 
Glasersfeld’s work. it is interesting to notice 
here that slezak adds this notion of “veil of 
ideas,” not von Glasersfeld, and then uses 
this notion to brand RC 
as idealism.
The realist will 
claim, as do de la torre 
and Zamorano (2001), 
that by dint of our men-
tal effort we can know 
the nature of a mind-
independent world 
with ever increasing 
accuracy. setting aside this one premise, 
at least temporarily in order to understand 
RC, would enable the realist not to have to 
struggle to give RC labels that do not fit as 
exemplified in the previous two quotations. 
i am not suggesting that the realist must ac-
cept abandoning the premise that we can 
know the mind-independent world, merely 
that the realist suspend the premise for the 
purpose of understanding RC. Having set 
aside the premise temporarily, the realist 
will see that statements, claims, and de-
scriptions made in RC truly do fit the tenets 
of RC and its description of human know-
ing. such statements, claims, and descrip-
tions were formulated to be consistent with 
RC. They were not formulated to be consis-
tent with realism, so it is no surprise when 
a realist points this out. dykstra (2007) has 
expanded on this point in the pages of Con-
structivist Foundations.
How might we help the realist to see RC 
as it is? The following strategy is adapted 
from one shown to be highly effective at in-
ducing conceptual change (dykstra 2005). 
if we in RC wish to deal with this issue of 
this normative first response to RC, first 
we must accept that it happens and must 
expect it to happen. if it were the case that 
insisting that critics are misconstruing RC 
would result in them realizing what RC is, 
we would see different responses to our ef-
forts than we see. insisting and telling them 
that it is so, is as ineffective in this case as it 
is in science teaching.
It is no surprise at all that 
the first reaction to a 
description of RC is that 
RC is just solipsism
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Because understanding RC requires the 
individual to become aware of a fundamental 
premise of realism, that we can know a mind-
independent world through our thinking, 
then a first step would be to engage the real-
ist in discussion examining the fundamental 
features of their beliefs. When one is unaware 
of the foundations of one’s views, then one is 
doomed to be a victim of these foundations, 
RC or not. once their position on the possi-
bility of knowing a mind-independent world 
by mental effort is explicit to them, then the 
interaction can move to exploring the possi-
bility of setting this position aside temporar-
ily, which can be the object of the discussion. 
This discussion will inevitably lead to consid-
ering the consequences of setting the position 
aside. at this point, if the previous steps have 
been carried out, the RC and the realist are in 
a position to discuss the nature of knowledge 
from the RC point of view as one possible 
consequence of these steps.
on education
That RC is of no value to education and 
the preparation of teachers is often repeated, 
as we see in slezak’s paper and in nola’s writ-
ing as we see it quoted in the paper. The pa-
per opens with:
“ despite its overwhelming influence among edu-
cationalists, i suggest that the ‘radical construc-
tivism’ of von Glasersfeld is an example of fash-
ionable but thoroughly obscure and problematic 
doctrines that can have no benefit for practical 
pedagogy or teacher education.” (slezak 2010, 
abstract)
Later we find:
“ such insights are surely familiar to teachers in-
nocent of constructivism or any other philoso-
phy, for that matter. We will see that this stark 
discrepancy between philosophical pretensions 
and practical pedagogy is the consistent pattern 
in constructivist writings. For example, as nola 
(1998: 33) has noted, effective teaching methods 
that may be an alternative to didactivism cannot 
be inferred from a non-realist philosophy of sci-
ence.” (slezak 2010: 103)
“ Fully acknowledging the distinction between 
denying a mind-independent world and the claim 
that we cannot know it, it remains that the rel-
evance and bearing of these matters on education 
must remain zero.” (slezak 2010: 104)
in order to convince us of the verity of 
this claim that RC can have no benefit for 
practical pedagogy or teacher education, 
the RC critic must logically prove the claim 
or demonstrate that actual evidence col-
lected in classrooms that applying a peda-
gogy developed from RC results in either 
poorer, or at least no better, learning results 
from the students when compared to the 
majority pedagogy based in realism. But 
neither is present in the paper – no data on 
learning results from the classroom is cit-
ed and the same claim is repeated several 
times with no proof. as such, we have no 
reason to accept the claim introduced in 
the abstract.
We can easily determine that the RC 
critic is on thin ice with respect to such 
claims about RC and education. in the 
first issue of Constructivist Foundations, 
evidence is presented that reveals an RC, 
Piaget-based pedagogy results in change in 
student understanding that is far superior 
to that achieved in traditional pedagogy. in 
fact the difference is so great that one does 
not need statistics to see it in the data. 
table 1 shows that good folk theory 
teaching (at good universities by Ph.d. 
physicists assisted by graduate students 
in physics using the best texts and well 
equipped instructional laboratories) leaves 
the science and engineering majors still 
with the everyday, common sense concep-
tion that as the force changes, so changes 
the velocity. This would be perfectly fine if 
indeed that was the intent of the professor 
and textbook author, but it is not. Yet the 
very students most physics professors be-
lieve really are not capable of understand-
ing physics demonstrate a class average 
shift indicative a significant percentage be-
ing able to demonstrate in their responses 
that as the net force changes, so changes the acceleration. The difference here is the 
RC-Piaget based pedagogy in contrast to 
the realism-based, folk theory instruction.
With this it seems that we have no rea-
son to accept this claim that the relevance 
of RC to education is zero. We have in front 
of us data collected in a careful way from 
real classrooms that contradicts the claim. 
The evidence also renders non sequitur any 
logical argument in support of the notion 
that RC can have no relevance to educa-
tion. This evidence is a direct challenge to 
the claim that anti-realist RC can have no 
relevance or bearing on pedagogy, that it 
can have no benefit for practical pedagogy, 
and that effective teaching methods cannot 
be derived from anti-realist RC. 
Lest one leap to a conclusion not in-
tended, the claim is not being made here 
that teaching with good results is pos-
sible only through RC. What the learning 
evidence cited represents is an example 
repeated over many semesters at university 
level that the claim that RC cannot or does 
not have any value to education is false.
type of 
instruction n
Pre-diagnostic 
score
Post-diagnostic
score majors
Folk theory-realist1 596 1.8 3.8
Science  
& Engineering
RC-Piagetian 365 1.1 9.8
Non-science 
Non-engineering
Table 1: Average scores on a diagnostic of student beliefs about the relationship between 
motion and force. A computed summary of data presented in Dykstra (2005). The diagnos-
tic was developed by Thornton & Sokoloff (1998). All scores included are matched pairs, pre 
and post instruction. The diagnostic is scored on a 15-point scale. The data from folk theory 
instruction was collected in multiple institutions across the U.S. over a period of a dozen 
years. The data from the RC-Piagetian instruction was collected at the same institutions 
over 6 years. 
(1) In folk theory pedagogy, teaching is the presentation of established canon by approved 
methods for the benefit of the deserving (Dykstra 2005).
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What is good teaching?
This question arises in assessing the 
claims often made in reference to the use-
fulness of RC to education. slezak writes 
as if good teaching is prevalent without RC 
and that much good teaching has been go-
ing on for a long time:
“ somehow good teaching has managed to flour-
ish despite the persistent obduracy of these [phil-
osophical] problems.” (slezak 2010: 103)
“ some of my best friends are dualists and great 
teachers.” (ibid: 103)
“ in the light of an undeniable history of centuries 
of successful teaching, it seems clear that teach-
ers and learners may manage effectively, even 
superlatively, without knowing or caring about 
psychology, much less epistemology or meta-
physics.” (ibid: 109)
if good teaching results in change in un-
derstanding of the phenomena being taught 
about, then the evidence is overwhelming 
that such is not the case with realism-driv-
en teaching. Evidence that such pedagogy 
in science education is a spectacular failure 
is massive. 
The tip of this iceberg of the failure of 
folk theory instruction is revealed in dyk-
stra (2005). in that paper a bibliography 
is referenced that contains thousands of 
pieces of research on students’ conceptions 
in refereed publications. all of the ones that 
examine the effect on students’ conceptions 
in normal (folk theory) instruction reveal 
the same results: essentially no change in 
student understanding. since RC critics 
clearly reject the notion that a RC-driven 
pedagogy can have any real relevance to 
education, then one can only imagine that 
“good teaching” is folk theory teaching. 
Hence, we must question these claims about 
good teaching and great teachers.
How might the realist, objectivist, mate-
rialist honestly be able to make such claims? 
it is fairly clear that the RC critic must have 
a different measure of the results of teach-
ing. in folk theory teaching, a portion of the 
established canon is presented (transmit-
ted) to the students by approved methods. 
to measure the effect of this teaching one 
naturally asks the students to show what 
they have “gotten” from the presentation 
by reporting it back in various ways called 
for by the instructor. From the evidence of 
research in student conceptions in science 
referred to above, it is clear that students 
can give back on exams what they have got-
ten from the presentations in ways that sat-
isfy the folk theory instructor. Furthermore, 
they can do this without any real effect on 
the conceptions of the phenomena they had 
when they came to the course. We see from 
table 1 that there is at least one pedagogy, 
based in RC, that has a far more substan-
tial effect on the understandings of students 
who participate with it.
in the discussion of constructivism and 
education, we find:
“ as the banality of the foregoing translations 
suggests, teaching and learning are among the 
natural, intuitive mental skills that humans 
display through a tacit knowledge rather than 
explicit theory or doctrine. in the light of an 
undeniable history of centuries of successful 
teaching, it seems clear 
that teachers and learners 
may manage effectively, 
even superlatively, with-
out knowing or caring 
about psychology, much 
less epistemology or meta-
physics. i have argued that 
teacher and learner are perhaps best conceived 
on the analogy of speaker and hearer in a con-
versation.” (slezak 2010: 109)
in particular, the passage “an undeniable 
history of centuries of successful teaching” 
is explicit evidence that the view of good 
teaching is apparently what was described 
above as folk theory (realism)-driven teach-
ing, which is demonstrably a spectacular 
failure at inducing change in understand-
ing, at least as described in physics and 
mathematics education research and other 
educational settings. 
For example Howard Gardner, not a sci-
ence educator, points out the problem:
“ if you answer questions on a multiple-choice 
test in a certain way, or carry out a problem set 
in a specified manner, you will be credited with 
understanding. no one ever asks the further 
question ‘But do you really understand?’ because 
that would violate an unwritten agreement: a 
certain kind of performance shall be accepted as 
adequate for this particular instructional context. 
The gap between what passes for understanding 
and genuine understanding remains great; it is 
noticed only sometimes […] and even then, what 
to do about it remains far from clear.
“ in speaking of ‘genuine understanding’ here, i 
intend no metaphysical point …[W]hat an ex-
tensive research literature now documents, is that 
even an ordinary degree of understanding is rou-
tinely missing in many, perhaps most students. 
(Gardner 1991: 6, emphasis in the original)
conclusion
i came to RC and initially made a logi-
cal assumption that it was about solipsism, 
which i reject. This assumption is very nat-
ural and logical, given that we grow up and 
are immersed in a realist culture. instead 
of rejecting RC, i struggled with a descrip-
tion of it until i was able to see how it made 
sense. That sense was not 
that RC is solipsism. at 
that point, i was in a po-
sition to make a proper 
decision about how it 
works and whether i 
thought it was useful. i 
did not have to decide to 
accept it at that point, just see how it works. 
i could not really make such a decision to 
accept or not accept RC until i could under-
stand how it works otherwise such a deci-
sion would be premature and ill informed. 
it appears that many authors of RC-critical 
papers have stopped at the first sentence of 
this paragraph in their own understanding 
of RC, as seems to be the case as evidenced 
in the present example.
once i saw how RC works, i realized 
i could use RC because it fits my under-
standing of how physics (science) is done. 
Just as important to me as an instructor, 
RC puts the construction of understanding 
as central to making sense of phenomena, 
and places this construction process in the 
“hands” of the students. Whether RC or 
not, i think that most thoughtful instruc-
tors would agree that only the students can 
change their own understanding.
This rush to judgment without actu-
ally understanding RC has been evidenced 
We have no reason to accept 
this claim that the relevance 
of RC to education is zero
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many times in many venues. it enables rais-
ing a collection of arguments against RC 
that are only valid if one applies to what an 
RC writes and says the notion that one can 
indeed know a mind-independent world. 
since this notion is the opposite of the cen-
tral distinction RC makes between itself 
and realism, none of the arguments pre-
sented can be valid for RC.
steffe and i are two of the research-
ers in mathematics and science learning 
who operate from a theory base for how 
we understand learning that we have de-
rived from Piaget and RC. We have seen 
evidence of substantial conceptual change 
made by students many 
times and we can inter-
pret it very well from an 
RC- and Piaget-based 
perspective. 
according to Piaget, 
based on observations 
collected by the Center 
for Genetic Epistemol-
ogy in Geneva, what we 
have come to call “con-
ceptual change” begins when a person be-
comes aware of a new experience that does 
not fit their existing mental structures, 
that is their understanding of their world 
of experience. Piaget calls this mismatch 
a “disequilibration.” it is most distinct 
when the person has elicited from herself 
a clear explanation justifying the expecta-
tion not met by the experience. if allowed 
and encouraged, the person will begin to 
modify and test alternative explanations 
to find one that fits the “offending” experi-
ence. People move to restore equilibration 
between their mental structures and their 
experiential world when they realize a dis-
equilibration.
We have used this explanation for 
change in understanding to devise instruc-
tional activities in science and mathematics 
that appear to induce this chain of events. 
The results are strong evidence that many 
students do construct an alternative expla-
nation, which they can use successfully and 
which constitute for them a re-equilibration 
with their expanded experiential world. 
Evidence of this has been presented in this 
commentary. 
This same strategy applied to working 
with realists is described near the end of 
the first section of this 
commentary. if we apply 
this strategy, born out of 
RC and Piaget’s idea of 
cognitive equilibration, 
to the challenge of help-
ing realists, objectivists, 
and materialists under-
stand RC, there is some 
promise that more will 
understand RC. in this 
effort we are not trying to prove RC is true 
and we are not trying to proselytize to swell 
our rank. instead we are trying to help oth-
ers understand RC so they can make honest 
judgments about it for their own use.
Because our RC perspective in learn-
ing is on understanding, i.e., how, why and 
under what circumstances it appears to 
change, we have little interest in whether 
or not a person can repeat back something 
they have been drilled and practiced at. 
drill and practice has an appropriate place 
in certain settings, but not when one is fo-
cused on changes in understanding.
Passages from slezak’s paper suggest a 
meaning for the phrase “good teaching” that 
is very consistent with what is called folk 
theory teaching. Evaluation of student per-
formance is mostly, if not completely, check-
ing to see if the students can give back in 
some appropriate way what was presented. 
With this notion of evidence of learning, 
there is no doubt that good teaching in this 
sense exists.
Research in physics and mathematics 
education reveals that responses worthy of 
credit in such courses can be generated with 
very little change in the understanding re-
quired. By the measure of change in under-
standing, the conclusion is that very little 
good teaching exists. Hence, again, using a 
realist perspective yields supportable claims, 
yet these claims are not applicable to what 
we find of value in learning.
The argument that good teaching exists 
without RC is based on the initial assump-
tion that we can know a mind-independent 
world through our mental efforts. unfor-
tunately, the initial assumption in RC is 
that we cannot know a mind-independent 
world; hence the realist claims about good 
teaching and that it is not necessary to go 
beyond common sense in teaching do not 
really carry water from the RC perspective. 
We in RC are not claiming realism applied 
to education is incorrect and RC contribu-
tions to education are true. We merely point 
out how RC applied to education works and 
what results it gets in education as compared 
to realist forms of pedagogy. The evidence is 
on the table. it is up to the readers to con-
sider it and act upon their conclusions.
in RC we acknowledge that our starting 
assumptions cannot be proven true. Hence, 
deWey i. dyKstra, Jr.
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we cannot claim that our assumption that a 
mind-independent world absolutely cannot 
be known (as opposed to such a world not 
existing) is true, but we have not yet found 
convincing evidence to the contrary. The re-
alist assumption that we can know by dint 
of our mental effort a mind-independent 
world is their fundamental assumption held 
as dear as the contrary is in RC. We see no 
convincing evidence in support of the real-
ist’s initial assumption.
it is amply demonstrated in the many 
papers and book chapters written against 
RC that when one does not use the RC 
initial assumption, that we cannot know a 
mind-independent world through any men-
tal efforts, then all the rest of RC is based 
logically on quicksand. indeed, one should 
not expect otherwise. Just as amply demon-
strated by these publications is that many of 
the authors apparently do not understand 
RC because they show no evidence of being 
able to use the initial assumption in RC in 
their thinking. if we, as practitioners of RC, 
wish to change the situation, change has to 
start by helping others to see how using the 
RC initial assumption works in interpreting 
our experiential worlds. 
The process outlined at the end of the 
first section of this commentary does not 
involve two people debating to win. it is ob-
vious that such a strategy does not make any 
significant difference. instead, the process 
outlined is more of an interaction where two 
or more people are really striving to under-
stand each other’s ideas instead of proving 
each other wrong. in such a context the pro-
cess described will result in mutual under-
standing, which in this case means those 
who do not already think in terms of the RC 
initial assumption come to be able to try this 
initial assumption on for size to see how it 
works; in other words come to understand 
the RC position on the nature of knowl-
edge and how it plays out. again, this is not 
about accepting the RC position, but merely 
understanding it. once RC is understood, 
there is no reason to write yet another arti-
cle proving RC wrong. The effort devoted to 
the writing such pieces can be expended in 
more useful efforts. to reach this goal, folks 
who agree with the RC view have to practice 
what they preach, instead of practicing what 
realism preaches.
references
de la Torre A. C. & Zamorano R. (2001) answer 
to question #31. does any piece of mathe-
matics exist for which there is no application 
whatsoever in physics? american Journal of 
Physics 69(2): 103.
Dykstra D. I. Jr. (2005) against realist instruc-
tion: superficial success masking catastroph-
ic failure and an alternative. Constructivist 
Foundations 1(1): 49–60. available at http://
www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/jour-
nal/1/1/049.dykstra
Dykstra D. I. Jr. (2007) The challenge of under-
standing radical constructivism. Construc-
tivist Foundations 2(2–3): 50–57. available 
at http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/
journal/2/2-3/050.dykstra
Gardner H. (1991) The unschooled mind. Basic 
Books, new York.
Glasersfeld E. von (1995a) Radical constructiv-
ism: a way of knowing and learning. Falmer 
Press, London.
Glasersfeld E. von (1995b) a constructivist 
approach to teaching. in: steffe L. P. & Gale 
J. (eds.) Constructivism in education. Law-
rence Erlbaum, Hillsdale nJ: 3–15.
Glasersfeld E. von (1984) introduction to radical 
constructivism. in: Watzlawick P. (ed.) The 
invented reality. norton, new York: 17–40. 
available at http://www.vonglasersfeld.
com/070.1
Nola R. (1998) Constructivism in science and 
science education: a philosophical critique. 
in: Matthews M. R. (ed.) Constructivism 
in science education. Kluwer, dordrecht: 
31–59.
Planck M. (1932) Where is science going? W. W. 
norton & Co, new York. Reprinted in 1981 
by ox Bow Press, Woodbridge Ct.
Quine W. V. (1961) identity, ostension, and 
hypostasis. in: Quine W. v., From a logical 
point of view. Harper, new York: 65–79.
Slezak P. (2010) Radical constructivism: Episte-
mology, education and dynamite. Construc-
tivist Foundations 6(1): 102–111. available 
at http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/
journal/6/1/102.slezak
Steffe L. (2010) Consequences of rejecting 
constructivism: “Hold tight and pedal fast”. 
Constructivist Foundations 6(1): 112–119. 
available at http://www.univie.ac.at/con-
structivism/journal/6/1/112.steffe
Steffe L. P. & Gale J. (eds.) (1995) Construc-
tivism in education. Lawrence Erlbaum: 
Hillsdale nJ.
Thornton R. K. & Sokoloff D. R. (1998) assess-
ing student learning of newton’s laws: The 
force and motion conceptual evaluation and 
the evaluation of active learning laboratory 
and lecture curricula. american Journal of 
Physics 66: 338–352.
Received: 12 october 2010 
accepted: 30 october 2010
